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THE EMERGING EFFECTS OF THE DRUG
PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT
TERM RESTORATION ACT OF
1984
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 19841
(the Act) was enacted to serve two competing objectives: 1) to make more
low cost generic drugs available to the public; and 2) to create new incentives
for research and development of certain products subject to premarket ap-
proval by the government.2 To accomplish the first objective, the Act estab-
lished an abbreviated new drug application procedure for generic drugs
undergoing marketing approval before the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA).3 Congress addressed the second objective by creating a procedure to
restore the patent life of products awaiting premarketing approval by the
FDA.4
In Part I, this Comment will focus briefly on the history and provisions of
the Act. Part II will address the effects of the legislation, Part III will ex-
amine whether the objectives of the Act are being met, and finally, Part IV
will suggest changes through which the Act could be amended or interpreted
to more effectively accomplish its stated objectives.
I. HISTORY AND PROVISIONS
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
was the result of a compromise between the generic and pioneer drug indus-
tries. The generic drug industry,5 supported by a number of consumer inter-
est groups, lobbied Congress to enact legislation that would simplify the
approval procedure for generic drugs whose brand name equivalents were
1. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 and 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282
(1984)). The Act is also known in the drug industry as the "Waxman-Hatch Act." Ellen
Goldbaum, It Gets Tougher to Grow Rapidly in Generic Drugs, CHEMICAL WK., Nov. 18, 1987,
at 7.
2. H.R. REP. No. 857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 14, 15 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648.
3. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (1988).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (1988).
5. H.R. REP. No. 857, supra note 2, at pt. 2, at 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2688. The generic drug industry was primarily represented by the Generic Pharmaceutical
Industry Association (GPIA). Id.
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already approved by the FDA.6 Legislation introduced by Congressman
Henry A. Waxman (D-Cal.) provided for an abbreviated new drug applica-
tion (ANDA) procedure whereby generic drugs could be approved by the
FDA if they were shown to be the "bioequivalent" of an approved drug.7
The ANDA provision would eliminate the expense and delay of proving the
safety and effectiveness of a generic drug in clinical tests on humans when a
pioneer drug manufacturer had already proven such requirements."
The pioneer drug industry,9 on the other hand, had complained since the
late 1970s that the seventeen year patent term for pioneer drugs patented
prior to receiving FDA approval was effectively reduced by the time that it
took the FDA to approve the product for the consumer market. ' The in-
dustry argued that this loss in the effective life of the patent was damaging
because it reduced the incentive to invest the large sums of money necessary
for research and development of new and innovative drug products." To
6. Prior to passage of the Act, the FDA required manufacturers of both pioneer and
generic drugs to conduct clinical tests on humans to show that their drugs were both safe and
effective. In order to gain marketing approval, the results were then submitted for approval to
the FDA in a new drug application (NDA). An exception to this requirement, however, al-
lowed for an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) procedure whereby the generic drug
manufacturer needed only to show that the generic drug was the same as a pioneer drug ap-
proved prior to 1962 and that it would be properly manufactured and labeled. Id. at pt. 1, at
16, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2649.
7. H.R. 3605, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H5273 (1983).
A drug shall be considered bioequivalent to [an approved] drug if the rate and extent
of absorption of the generic drug do not show a significant difference from the rate
and extent of absorption of the [approved] drug when administered at the same mo-
lar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental conditions in either
a single dose or multiple doses.
H.R. REP. No. 857, supra note 2, at pt. 1, at 31, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2664.
8. H.R. REP. No. 857, supra note 2, at pt. 1, at 16, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2649.
9. The pioneer drug industry was primarily represented by the Pharmaceutical Manufac-
turers Association (PMA). Id. at pt. 2, at 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2664. The
"pioneer drug industry" generally includes those drug manufacturers that are the first to de-
velop, manufacture, and market new drugs. This industry is often referred to as the "brand
name drug industry." However, by 1989 brand name drug producers were also producing
generic equivalents which accounted for approximately 25% of the generic drug market.
Skyrocketing Prescription Drug Prices: Hearings Before the Special Comm. on Aging, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 156 (1989) [hereinafter Skyrocketing Prescription Drug Prices Hearings 1989]
(statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association President).
10. H.R. REP. No. 857, supra note 2, at pt. 2, at 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2687.
11. See id. at pt. 2, at 6, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2690 ("[P]roponents of [patent
term restoration] have argued that without some form of legislative relief in this area there
would be a diminished stimulus to innovation and research. Thus, it is argued patent term
extensions will create incentives for increased expenditures.").
In 1989, pioneer drug manufacturers spent $7.3 billion in private funds for research and
development (R&D); in 1988, the industry invested 16.3% of its sales in R&D, compared with
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address this problem, both houses of Congress introduced patent term resto-
ration bills.12
When it became clear that neither the ANDA nor the patent term restora-
tion proposals could singlehandedly gain enough support for passage, legis-
lators agreed to combine the two. 3 The result of this compromise was the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, signed
into law by President Reagan on September 24, 1984.14
The Act consists of three parts: Title I which provides for the ANDA
procedure, Title II which implements the patent term restoration provision,
and Title III, which is an unrelated provision dealing with textile labeling.
Title I, the ANDA provision,'" establishes a generic drug approval proce-
dure for pioneer drugs approved after 1962, by amending the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 16 Under the provisions of Title I, the FDA must
approve the ANDA within 180 days' from the time of filing if the applicant
shows that: 1) the conditions for prescribed, recommended, or suggested use
for the new generic drug have been previously approved for a prior drug;'
8
2) the generic drug has the same active ingredient(s) as the prior approved
drug;' 9 3) the generic drug uses the same route of administration, dosage
form, and strength as the approved drug;2' 4) the generic drug is the "bioe-
quivalent" of an approved drug;2 ' and 5) the labeling proposed for the ge-
10.2% in 1965. Skyrocketing Prescription Drug Prices Hearings 1989, supra note 9, at 122-23.
In other high-technology industries in the U.S. the average investment in R&D is 3.4% of
sales. Id. at 171.
12. H.R. REP. No. 857, supra note 2, at pt. 2, at 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2687.
13. See Marjorie Sun, The Price for More Generic Drugs, 224 Sci. 369, 370 (1984). How-
ever, some experts believed the tradeoff by the generic industry was unnecessary as pressure
had been building for years for an ANDA procedure. See Gerald F. Hogan, Repercussions of
the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 42 AM. J. HosP. PHAR-
MACY 849, 850 (1985).
14. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
15. Pub. L. No. 98-417, §§ 101-105, 98 Stat. 1585, 1585-97 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 355, 505 (1988)).
16. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-
392 (1988)).
17. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(A) (1988). The applicant ind FDA may agree to extend the
180 day limit. Id.
18. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i).
19. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii).
20. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iii).
21. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).
A drug shall be considered to be a bioequivalent to a listed drug if -
(i) the rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not show a significant difference
from the rate and extent of absorption of the listed drug when administered at the
same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental conditions
in either a single dose or multiple doses; or
1992]
364 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 8:361
neric drug is the same as the labeling approved for the prior drug.22
Additionally, applicants must certify that, in their opinion and to the best of
their knowledge, neither the generic drug nor its use is patented, or, if pat-
ented, then the applicant must certify: 1) that the patent has expired, 2) the
date the patent will expire, or 3) that the patent is invalid or will not be
infringed.2" If the generic drug or its use is not patented or if the patent has
expired, then the approval is effective immediately.24 If the generic drug or
its use is patented, then the approval is effective on the patent's expiration
date.25 When the applicant certifies that the patent is invalid or will not be
infringed, the effective date of approval may be delayed 180 days if the pat-
ent owner files an action for patent infringement.2 6 Finally, Title I provides
that pioneer drugs approved for the first time after the enactment of the
legislation receive four to five years of exclusive market life,27 and if ap-
proved for the first time between 1982 and the legislation's date of enact-
ment, the pioneer drugs receive an exclusive market life of ten years.28
Title II of the Act added a new section 29 to the U.S. Patent Code provid-
ing for the extension of the seventeen year patent term on certain products
subject to premarket approval, their method of use, or their method of man-
ufacture. Under the Code, an inventor of "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition'of matter, or any new and useful im-
(ii) the extent of absorption of the drug does not show a significant difference from
the extent of absorption of the listed drug when administered at the same molar dose
of the therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental conditions in either a single
dose or multiple doses and the difference from the listed drug in the rate of absorp-
tion of the drug is intentional, is reflected in its proposed labeling, is not essential to
the attainment of effective body drug concentrations on chronic use, and is consid-
ered medically insignificant for the drug.
§ 355(j)(7)(B).
22. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v).
23. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
24. § 355(j)(4)(B)(i).
25. § 355(j)(4)(B)(ii).
26. § 355(j)(4)(B)(iii)-(iv).
27. § 355(j)(4)(D)(ii). This provision, which prohibits the approval of a generic
equivalent for four years, is of particular importance for those pioneer drugs that are unpatent-
able or whose patents are invalid. For example, if an inventor publishes a paper disclosing her
new drug more than one year prior to the filing of a patent application her drug would be
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C § 102(b) (1988) ("A person shall be entitled to a patent unless...
(b) the invention was patented or described in this or a foreign country or in public use or on
sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the
United States ...."). However, the new drug could be approved for sale in the United States
by the FDA in a new drug application (NDA) pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1988).
28. § 355(j)(4)(d)(i). This provision is of particular importance for those pioneer drugs
that are unpatentable or whose patents are invalid.
29. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (1988).
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provement thereof, may obtain a patent .... ,"o provided that the invention
is novel3 and not obvious.32 A patent gives its owner "the right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United
States .. " for a term of seventeen years.33 The products that qualify for
patent term extension include drug products,34 "medical devices, food addi-
tive[s], [and] color additive[s] subject to regulation under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act."35 Additionally, Title II amends the patent code
by providing that "[iut shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, or
sell a patented invention.., solely for uses reasonably related to the develop-
ment and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs ....
Title II places four limitations on the period of patent extension. First,
the extension is limited to two years for those products being tested or await-
ing approval at the time of the enactment of the legislation.37 Second, the
extension period for all other products is limited to five years.3 ' Third, any
period of time in which the manufacturer failed to act with due diligence in
gaining approval will be subtracted from the extension. 39 Finally, the patent
term remaining at the time of regulatory approval cannot be extended be-
yond fourteen years under the term extension provisions.'
II. THE EFFECTS OF THE ACT
A. The ANDA Provision
One of the most dramatic changes in the prescription drug industry since
the passage of the Act has been the increase in the generic drug industry's
prescription drug market share from eight percent in 1984 to thirty-three
30. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
32. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
33. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
34. A "drug product" is defined as the active ingredient of "a new drug, antibiotic drug,
... human biological product [or a]... new animal drug or veterinary biological product...
which is not primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma
technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques .... " 35
U.S.C. § 156(f(2)(A)-(B) (1988).
35. 35 U.S.C. § 156(0(1) (1988).
36. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).(1988).
37. 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(C) (1988).
38. § 156(g)(6)(A)-(B).
39. 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(1) (1988). "'[D]ue diligence' means that degree of attention, con-
tinuous directed effort, and timeliness as may reasonably be expected from, and ordinarily
exercised by a person during a regulatory review period." 35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(3) (1988).
40. § 156(c)(3).
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percent in 1989.41 The ANDA provision has highlighted a number of fac-
tors that create this progeneric environment. These factors include: the re-
cent expiration of a significant number of patents on widely prescribed
drugs;42 the demand by patients, hospitals, and health insurance companies
for less expensive drugs;4 3 the recent dramatic price increase for prescription
drugs;" and the enactment of state laws which permit and often encourage
the doctor or pharmacist to authorize the use of a generic, rather than a
brand name drug.45 The change from brand name to generic drugs generally
provides savings between thirty and fifty percent," and in some cases the
savings may be as high as ninety percent.47
At the time of the enactment of the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984, it was estimated that the ANDA provision
would save consumers $920 million over the first 12 years, as well as provide
substantial savings to federal and state governments by increasing the availa-
bility of lower priced generic drugs for government supported health pro-
grams.48 In 1985, generic drug manufacturers flooded the FDA with 1069
41. Generic Drugs: Still Safe?, CONSUMER REP., May 1990, at 310 (table) (The generic
drug share of the prescription market was 2.0% in 1982, 3.4% in 1983, 8.0% in 1984, 13.8%
in 1985, 19.3% in 1986, 23.7% in 1987, 28.8% in 1988, and 33.1% in 1989) [hereinafter
Generic Drugs]. Other sources place the generic drug market share at 6% in 1984. Christo-
pher S. Eklund, Generics Grab More of the Drug Action, Bus. WK., May 13, 1986, at 64. See
also Sari Horwitz, New Law Stimulating Generic-Drug Market, WASH. POST, June 28, 1985, at
B1.
42. "[E]ight of the ten highest dollar-volume pharmaceuticals in the U.S. lost patent pro-
tection between 1984 and 1986." Goldbaum, supra note 1, at 7. See also Horwitz, supra note
41, at B2 ("By the end of the decade [1990], nearly all of the current 50 top-selling drugs will
be free from patent restrictions and possibly available in generic form .... ").
43. Eklund, supra note 41, at 64; see also Horwitz, supra note 41, at B2.
44. The American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) reports that "[b]etween 1980
and 1989, prescription drug prices rose by 128%, compared with an increase in the overall
Consumer Price Index (CPI) of just over 50%" and that "[i]n 1989 alone, when the overall
rate of inflation was 4.8%, average prescription drug prices rose by 8.7%." Rx for Generic
Drug Safety: Accurate Information for Older Americans: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Housing and Consumer Interests of the Select Comm. on Aging House of Representatives, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1990) [hereinafter Rxfor Generic Drug Safety Hearing] (statement of Kath-
leen Col, AARP representative).
45. See, e.g., Eklund, supra note 41, at 64 ("Connecticut... offers a $.50 bonus to drug-
gists for every generic-drug prescription they are able to substitute when filling prescriptions
for medicaid patients."); see also Horwitz, supra note 41, at B2. For a detailed discussion of
the barriers to the use of generic drugs, see James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition and Phar-
maceutical Innovation: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
35 CATH. U. L. REV. 433 (1985).
46. Rxfor Generic Drug Safety Hearing, supra note 44, at 26 (statement of Kathleen Col,
AARP representative).
47. Robin M. Henig, Fraud Case Raises Doubts About Generic Drug Quality, WASH.
POST, July 18, 1989, (Health Magazine), at 6.
48. H.R. REP. No. 857, supra note 2, at pt. 2, at 17-19, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
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ANDAs compared with 470 generic drug applications the previous year.49
Small companies specializing in generic drugs became overnight successes.
For example, Mylan Laboratories, Inc., of Pittsburgh, saw its earnings grow
166% to $12.5 million and its stock jump 800% in eighteen months.50 In
1987, Medicaid bolstered the industry's growth with the institution of the
Pharmacists' Incentive Program which encourages pharmacists to substitute
generic drugs for more costly brand name drugs.5 The incentive program
has saved the federal and state governments over $100 million annually.-2
The tremendous growth of the generic drug industry has come at the ex-
pense of the brand name industry and has fostered stiff competition between
the two. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association estimates that
within one year after a patent on a pioneer drug expires, thirty-five percent
of the market is lost to generic substitutes and by the second year, fifty per-
cent of the market is controlled by the generic industry. 3 In one instance,
Hoffman-LaRouche Inc., a brand name drug manufacturer, was faced with
the expiration of its patent on Valium (a popular tranquilizer) and the filings
of ANDAs by at least two generic drug makers for generic equivalents.5 4
The company streamlined its operation by dismissing 1000 of its 8000 em-
ployees,5 5 attempted to capitalize on consumer loyalty by punching a dis-
tinctive "V" in the middle of its Valium tablets, 6 and filed a petition with
the FDA challenging the manner in which the generic ANDAs are shown to
be equivalent. 7 Critics, however, claimed that the petition as well as other
similar actions by the brand name industry merely amount to delaying
tactics.5 8
2650-52. ("In fiscal year 1983, the federal government spent approximately $2.4 billion for
drugs in the Medicaid program, and in veteran and military hospitals.").
49. FDA's Generic Drug Approval Process (Part 2): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1989) [hereinafter FDA Investigation Hearings (Part 2)] (statement of
Frank E. Young, M.D., Ph.D., FDA Commissioner).
50. Eklund, supra note 41, at 64; see also Horwitz, supra note 41, at B2.
51. FDA Investigation Hearings: (Part 2), supra note 49, at 69 (statement of Frank E.
Young, M.D., Ph.D., FDA Commissioner).
52. Id.
53. The High Cost of Prescription Drugs Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Aging House
of Representatives, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1990) [hereinafter High Cost of Prescription Drugs
Hearing 1990] (statement of Lynda L. Nersesian, PMA Representative).
54. Reginald Rhein, A Soaring Market in Generics Draws the Drug Majors, CHEMICAL
WK., Mar. 20, 1985, at 8.
55. Eklund, supra note 41, at 68.
56. Rhein, supra note 54, at 8. In a similar effort, Ayerst Laboratories of American Home
Products gave its brand name drug, Inderal, a distinctive hexagonal shape. Id.
57. Horwitz, supra note 41, at B2.
58. Id.
1992]
368 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 8:361
In another effort to protect market share, the brand name drug industry
pointed to several limited examples in which individuals experienced
problems when switching from one version of a drug to another, warning
against "indiscriminate switching of drug products, whether from brand-
name to generic, generic to brand-name, or from one generic to another
. The industry contended that "[p]atients on maintenance regimens
whose daily dosage must be individualized are especially at risk when drug
products are changed."'  In a hearing on drug industry competition, Sena-
tor Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) charged that brand name pharmaceuti-
cal companies have attempted to discourage the use of generic drugs.6, The
companies' efforts included letters to pharmacists implying that they would
be liable for prescribing generic drugs, claiming the drugs to be inferior; let-
ters to physicians warning that their patients' health and welfare will suffer if
doctors insist on prescribing generics; paying so-called "experts" to tour the
country and make speeches about the dangers of generic drugs; funding in-
stitutions to report the alleged problems associated with generic drugs; ad-
vertising in medical journals stressing the need to insist that prescriptions be
filled only with brand name drugs; presenting scientifically flawed studies to
state authorities that suggest the superiority of brand name drugs; and un-
dertaking studies that falsely suggest that brand name drugs are less expen-
sive than generics.62 Congressman Waxman has alleged that the brand
name drug industry is waging an "aggressive anti-generic campaign" and is
"spending millions of dollars on false and misleading advertising to raise
doubts in the minds of physicians, pharmacists, and consumers about the
safety and effectiveness of generic drugs.",6' Dee Fensterer, President of the
Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association (GPIA), contends that
"[e]very day the increasing use of generic products can be retarded by even a
few percentage points translates into millions of dollars in sales for these
firms" and that "[c]reating even the slightest doubt about the comparative
59. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Generics vs. Brand-Names: Patient Health is Heart of the De-
bate, Bus. INS., Sept. 12, 1988, at 47. The author, Gerald J. Mossinghoff, is president of the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association. See also Competitive Problems in the Pharmaceu-
tical Drug Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business
Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary US. Senate, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 102-03 (1987) [herein-
after Competitive Problems Hearing 1987] (statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff).
60. Competitive Problems Hearing 1987, supra note 59, at 102 (statement of Gerald J.
Mossinghoff).
61. Id. at 2 (statement of Senator Metzenbaum).
62. Id. Another interesting tactic used by the brand name drug firm Ayerst allowed phy-
sicians to receive free airline tickets for prescribing Ayerst's product, Inderal L.A., to fifty
patients and filling out a marketing survey. Id. at 16 (statement of Dr. Jere E. Goyan, Dean,
School of Pharmacy, Univ. of Calif., San Francisco, Ca.).
63. Horwitz, supra note 41, at B I.
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safety and efficacy or therapeutic equivalence of generic drugs . . . helps
brand-name marketers to persuade physicians to preclude the substitution of
equivalent generic drugs ....
Although the competition between generic and brand name drug manu-
facturers has been fierce, the competition among generic drug manufacturers
themselves has been even more intense. The drug company that first mar-
kets a generic substitute for a widely used brand name drug that lost patent
protection stands to gain substantially in short term profits by establishing a
foothold in the market before other generics are approved. 65  The high
stakes of being the first to market a generic substitute, coupled with the rap-
idly expanding generic drug market, has created an environment in which a
troubling number of instances of fraud and corruption have surfaced.
In June, 1988, the generic firm Mylan Laboratories exposed the first in-
stances of illegal activity.6 6 Frustrated by what Mylan executives perceived
as inequities in the ANDA approval process and the failure of FDA man-
agement to respond to complaints, the company hired a private detective to
investigate its suspicions that competing generic drug manufacturers were
bribing FDA employees in order to obtain quicker approval of their generic
drug applications. 67 The investigator discovered evidence that payoffs had
been made to a supervisory FDA chemist. Mylan turned the evidence over
to the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Inves-
tigations, which began its own investigation. 6' The House investigation re-
64. Dee Fensterer, Generics vs. Brand-Names: Therapeutic Debate Hides Real Issue, Bus.
INS., Sept. 12, 1988, at 48.
65. Generic Drugs, supra note 41, at 311 ("The first firm [to market a generic version of a
popular drug] could charge relatively high prices... and clinch the lion's share of generic sales
for several months or more. By contrast, latecomers gained but a sliver of the market and
charged much less .... ); see also Henig, supra note 47, at 6.
66. FDA's Generic Drug Approval Process (Part 1): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 120-1 (1989) (hereinafter FDA Investigation Hearings (Part 1)] (state-
ment of Chairman Rep. John Dingell (D-Mich.)).
67. Id. Dingell characterized Mylan's action as "very courageous." Id. James Benson,
Acting FDA Commissioner, testified before Congress that the FDA management possibly
failed to take action on Mylan's complaints because "they didn't feel the tips were well
grounded," there were "concerns" in the Agency about taking action against its employees,
fears of "getting in the way of evolution of the industry," and the allegations were in part
discounted because of their source. Penalties for Illegal Activities in the Approval of Drugs:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the Comm. on Energy and
Commerce House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50 (1990) [hereinafter Penalties
Hearing 1990].
68. FDA Investigation Hearings (Part 1), supra note 66, at 120. Mylan's "gamble paid off
when they were able to obtain photographs and other documentary evidence that strongly
suggested Mr. [Charles] Chang [the supervisory chemist] was receiving gifts of considerable
value from generic drug firms." Id. at 121.
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sulted in a number of charges against, and convictions of, FDA officials,
drug firms, and consultants.69 In July 1989, the scandal unfolded further
with the discovery that at least one generic drug firm had substituted a previ-
ously approved brand name drug for its generic sample to support its
ANDA.7 ° Further probes indicated that some generic drug companies had
falsified the test results required for ANDA approval.7 1 In regard to the
substitution of brand name drugs for the required generic samples, Repre-
sentative John D. Dingell (D-Mich.), Chairman of the House Energy and
Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, stated, "[N]o one
at the FDA knows the composition, much less the bioavailability, of the
medicine that is actually prescribed and sold to the unsuspecting public."72
Dingell continued, "If a firm is willing to risk bribing or attempting to bribe
an FDA employee to achieve a competitive advantage, why not commit the
less risky fraud of switching testing materials?"73 U.S. Attorney Breckin-
ridge L. Wilcox, commenting on American Therapeutics' guilty plea for
paying more than $60,000 in illegal gratuities to FDA chemists, falsifying
test records, obstructing FDA inspections, and ignoring manufacturing stan-
dards, characterized the company's behavior as "benign when compared to
some of its competitors" and predicted that the "picture will get even darker
as the probe of the industry continues."74
By November 1989 the FDA had collected and analyzed over 2,500 sam-
ples representing the 30 most prescribed generic drugs in an effort to deter-
mine the extent of the fraud and to ensure that the nation's drug supply was
safe and effective." Approximatley 1% of the 2,500 samples failed to com-
69. Among those charged were David Brancato, a chemist who reviewed generic drug
applications and pleaded guilty to accepting bribes of approximately $9,600, and his boss,
Charles Chang, who pleaded guilty to racketeering charges for accepting almost $20,000 worth
of "unlawful benefits." Henig, supra note 47, at 6. As of January 1991, "five FDA employees,
seven executives of generic drug firms, one consultant, and three manufacturing companies
have been convicted on charges ranging from racketeering to giving and receiving thousands of
dollars in cash, furniture, free trips, and other gratuities." Paul W. Valentine, Former FDA
Official Is Sentenced in Generic Drug Inquiry, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1991, at A9.
70. Vitarine Pharmaceuticals of Queens, N.Y. admitted to submitting as their generic ver-
sion of Dyazide, the original Dyazide packaged in a Vitarine capsule, as well as making similar
switches in four other generic drug applications. Henig, supra note 47, at 6.
71. Paul W. Valentine, $1 Million Fine Levied in Generic Drug Fraud, WASH. POST, Oct.
19, 1990, at A3. In a proceeding against the generic firm American Therapeutics, Inc., prose-
cutors filed a statement alleging that "company employees fabricated stability test results and
back dated data on potency, content uniformity and hardness for various drugs. In other
cases, they exaggerated the size of research batches to meet FDA standards ...." Id.
72. FDA Investigation Hearings (Part 2), supra note 49, at 48.
73. Id.
74. Valentine, supra note 71, at A3.
75. FDA's Generic Drug Approval Process (Part 3): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives,
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ply with the standards established by the United States Pharmacopocia or
the FDA7 6-a ratio consistent with historical rates for brand name and ge-
neric drug products.7 7 Additionally, specialized inspections by the FDA
identified seven firms having applications based "at least in part, on fraudu-
lent or questionable data."7 In each case, the FDA "requested a recall,
changed that product's bioequivalence rating, and/or proceeded to withdraw
marketing approval." '7 9 By early 1990, approximately 63 products involving
the seven firms had been affected out of a generic drug industry comprised of
approximately 350 firms and 8,000 to 9,000 products.8 " The series of spe-
cialized inspections also uncovered twelve other firms that deviated from
FDA regulations on Good Manufacturing Practice; the Agency took regula-
tory action against these firms.81 Further, to insure that product safety was
not in question, the FDA reviewed applications handled by three former
FDA employees found guilty of accepting illegal gratuities as well as appli-
cations submitted by the four firms who offered the bribes.8 2
As a result of what has been termed "the worst scandal in the history of
the Food and Drug Administration,"8 3 the agency instituted new procedures
to control and limit access of drug company officials to FDA reviewers.8 4 In
addition, the Agency implemented procedures regarding the assignment of
applications to ensure that certain firms are not arbitrarily treated in a pref-
erential or discriminatory manner and mandated "ethics awareness train-
ing" for all FDA employees.8 " Furthermore, in August 1989 the Agency
announced plans to intensify its surveillance of the generic drug industry,
reorganize the drug review program into a newly created office of generic
drugs, establish an independent ombudsman to report directly to the FDA
Commissioner, coordinate more closely with the Inspector General of the
Department of Health and Human Services, lobby for legislation to
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 198-99 (1989) [hereinafter FDA Investigation Hearing (Part 3)] (re-
printing the FDA "Interim Report on Generic Drugs" dated Nov. 17, 1989 and submitted by
FDA Commissioner Frank E. Young)).
76. Id. at 199-200.
77. Id.
78. Rx for Generic Drug Safety Hearing, supra note 44, at 60 (statement of Dr. Carl C.
Peck, Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 61.
82. Id. at 60.
83. Kitty Dumas, Fallout From Drug Scandal May be a Stronger FDA, 48 CONG. Q. 664
(1990).
84. FDA Investigation Hearings (Part 2), supra note 49, at 74-75 (statement by FDA Com-
missioner Frank E. Young).
85. Id.
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strengthen the Secretary of Health and Human Services' power to act
against improprieties in connection with drug approval applications, and se-
cure additional funding from Congress to implement these actions.
8 6
Despite the steps taken by the FDA to ensure that the generic drug supply
is safe and effective, the public's confidence in the drugs remains shaken. A
study comparing consumer perceptions of generic drugs before and after the
scandal revealed that after the scandal, "consumers were more skeptical of
the safety, effectiveness, and quality of generics; were less willing to use or
recommend generics; and were even less likely to ask pharmacists about
generics.""7
B. The Patent Term Restoration Provision
The effects of the Act's patent term restoration provision are less obvious
than those of the ANDA provision. From the time of enactment through
February 1988, at least sixty-five patents were granted patent term extension
periods of no more than two years.8 8 When compared to the 201 ANDAs
filed with the FDA on the first day that the Act took effect,89 this number
appears relatively small. However, in making this comparison it is impor-
tant to recognize that for each brand name drug whose patent term has ex-
pired, several different ANDAs may be filed.9 Furthermore, the initial rush
of ANDA filings included many drugs whose patent terms had expired prior
to the effective date of the Act.9
Perhaps the best gauge for determining the effectiveness of the patent term
extension provision is to examine the strength of research and development
in the pharmaceutical industry. Proponents of the provision argued that "it
would create a significant, new incentive which would result in increased
expenditures for research and development, and ultimately in more innova-
86. FDA Investigation Hearing (Part 3), supra note 75, at 204-206 (FDA Interim Report).
87. Penalties Hearing 1990, supra note 67, at 86 (report by Mathew Perri, III, Ph.D. and
Alan P. Wolfgang, Ph.D., College of Pharmacy, University of Georgia). In 1988, 16.1% of
those surveyed strongly agreed, 68.8% agreed, 5.6% disagreed, and 1.1% strongly disagreed
with the statement that "[g]eneric prescription medications are just as safe as brand name
medications," compared with 10.2% who strongly agreed, 48.8% who agreed, 30.7% who
disagreed, and 4.7% who strongly disagreed with the same statement in October of 1989. Id.
at 89 (Table 1).
88. Alan D. Lourie, A Review of Recent Patent Term Extension Data, 71 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 171 (1989).
89. Hogan, supra note 13, at 850.
90. Generic Drugs: supra note 41, at 310 (explaining that "[t]here are more than 8000
generic clones of about 170 brand-name drugs.").
91. FDA Investigation Hearings (Part 2), supra note 49, at 70.
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tive drugs." 9 2  In 1987, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Association
(PMA) estimated expenditures of $5 billion for discovering new life-saving
medicines. 93 By 1989, the PMA estimated that research and development
expenditures had risen to $7.3 billion, or 16.3% of its sales94 compared to an
average 3.4% of sales for other high-technology industries. 95 Although the
increase in expenditures reflects many factors including inflation, increased
complexity of technology,96 and tax incentives, 97 it indicates that research
expenditures have increased significantly since passage of the Act.
The increased competition from generic drugs created by the ANDA pro-
vision is possibly a more significant factor in promoting research and devel-
opment for pioneer drugs than the patent term extension provision. As
recognized by Jacob Schein, Chief Executive Officer of the generic drug firm
Henry Schein, "the 'speed with which the large drug companies accelerate
their R&D programs and come up with new and exciting products' could
blunt generics growth." 8 Schein reasoned "that new drugs with increased
effectiveness could undercut the older generics." 99
Although the market effects of the Act's patent term restoration provision
are far from clear, the noninfringement clause of the provision has caused
most of the legal debate. The noninfringement clause provides that "[i]t
shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, or sell a patented invention
. solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or
sale of drugs . , oo The noninfringement clause has "the net effect of
reversing the holding of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in Roche Prod-
92. H.R. REP. No. 857, supra note 2, at pt. 1, at 18, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2651.
93. Competitive Problems Hearing 1987, supra note 59, at 58.
94. Skyrocketing Prescription Drug Prices Hearings 1989, supra note 9, at 122-23.
95. Id. at 171.
96. Cristine Gorman, The Price Isn't Right, TIME, Jan. 8, 1990, at 57 ("[D]rug companies
must contend with the increasing complex nature of medicine. Many of the 'simpler' bacterial
and viral illnesses... have passed from the scene .... Finding treatments for [heart disease,
diabetes, and Alzheimer's disease] and other chronic ailments requires more sophisticated re-
search, lengthier study and, of course, larger research budgets.").
97. Skyrocketing Prescription Drug Prices Hearing 1989, supra note 9, at 4. Committee
Chairman Senator David Pryor (D-Ark) argues that "[t]he American public is footing much of
the bill for these companies' research and development costs .... For example, in 1985 ...
drug companies received R&D-related tax breaks of almost $1 billion, representing more than
24% of their tax expenditures." Senator Pryor continued stating that, "[t]he 1986 tax law
provided even more liberal incentives for the drug companies in research and development and
other tax breaks and subsidies."
98. Rhein, supra note 54, at 8.
99. Id.
100. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1988).
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ucts, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc."' 0 1 In Roche, the defendant,
Bolar Pharmaceutical, a generic drug manufacturer, admitted to possessing
Roche's patented product, but argued that the use of the product was solely
for purposes of performing tests necessary to obtain data for a new drug
application before the FDA. °2 The court found that such use constituted
an act of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) and refused to make an
exception for testing necessary to gain regulatory approval. °3 While the
legislative reversal of Roche has been criticized as an unconstitutional taking
under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, 14 recent litigation has
focused on the statutory scope of the provision.
In Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic Inc.,105 the Supreme Court affirmed a
Federal Circuit Court of Appeal's decision that interpreted the noninfringe-
ment clause to include medical devices even though the particular provision
refers only to "the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.''1°6 Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, reasoned that "the phrase 'a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use or sale of drugs' more naturally summons up
the image of an entire statutory scheme of regulation"' ° and that, "[i]f only
101. H.R. REP. No. 857, supra note 2, at pt. 2, at 27, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2711. Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984).
102. 733 F.2d at 860.
103. Id. at 863. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) states, "Except as otherwise provided in this title, who-
ever without authority makes, uses, or sells any patented invention, within the United States
during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent."
104. See H.R. REP. No. 857, supra note 2, at pt. I at 74-75, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2684-85. "[T]he bill retrospectively deprives the patent holder of ... both a
contractual right between the patent holder and the U.S. Government and a recognized prop-
erty right. The Constitution prevents the Government from impairing the rights of contract
and from 'taking' or depriving one of a property right without just compensation." Id.; see
also Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2683, 2693 n.7 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 857,
supra note 2, at pt. 2 at 27-29, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2713 (citing the opinion of
the Library of Congress American Law Division that "while the constitutionality of § 202 is
far from a settled question, it does appear that respectable precedent exists by which to sustain
it under [a] Fifth Amendment challenge ....").
For an interesting constitutional challenge under Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8 of the Constitution,
("Congress shall have the Power To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries"), see Robert M. Patti, Section 202 of the Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act - Has Congress Acted Constitutionally?, 69 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 567 (1987) (arguing that the Constitution gives Congress the power to grant an exclu-
sive right and that while Congress has the power to regulate the standards for awarding that
exclusive right and the lifetime of that exclusive right, Congress has no power to make that
right nonexclusive).
105. 110 S. Ct. 2683 (1990).
106. Id. at 2686-87; 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1988).
107. 110 S. Ct. at 2686-87.
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[drug] patents were meant to be included, there were . . . infinitely more
clear and simple ways of expressing that intent."" ' The Court rejected Eli
Lilly's argument that the legislative history of the noninfringement provision
mentions only drugs,1" and instead focused on the "1984 Act taken as a
whole."1 ' In viewing the Act as a whole, the Court deemed it "implausi-
ble" that Congress would have intended to give the owners of medical device
patents the benefit of an extended patent life while awaiting FDA ap-
proval,"' 1 without also addressing the distortion in which generic manufac-
turers would be prevented from obtaining data to gain FDA approval so that
the generic product could be marketed immediately upon the expiration of
the patent.1 2 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice White, dissented from
what he considered "the Court's decision contrary to the most plausible
reading of the statutory language."1 13
III. ARE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ACT BEING MET?
The first objective of the Act was to make more low cost generic drugs
available to the public. In regard to this objective, the Act has increased the
availability of low cost generic drugs.1 ' However, this increase has not
come without a price. Once the patent term of a brand name medication
expires, the availability of generic equivalents results in an immediate drop
in the market share of the patented medication by as much as thirty-five
percent during the first year. 1 5 PMA President Gerald J. Mossinghoff con-
tends that the "market for brand name drugs virtually collapses, after the
expiration of the patent, because of the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984."' 1 6 The brand name industry, which relies
on the sale of existing drugs to fund its research and development,1 1 7 is
forced to make up for lost revenues by raising the prices on brand name
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2688 n.2.
110. Id. at 2688.
111. 35 U.S.C. § 156(0(1) specifically includes medical devices stating that "[flor purposes
of this section: (1) The term 'product' means: ... (B) Any medical device, food additive, or
color additive subject to regulation under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act".
112. 110 S. Ct. at 2690.
113. Id. at 2693 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
114. See Generic Drugs:, supra note 41, at 310. "The bioequivalence test [provided by the
ANDA provision] allowed generic firms to market products relatively quickly and inexpen-
sively. Soon after the 1984 law was passed, the FDA was being inundated with drug approval
applications. Generic drugs now account for about one-third of all new prescriptions filled by
pharmacists." Id.
115. High Cost of Prescription Drug Hearing 1990, supra note 53, at 21.
116. Skyrocketing Prescription Drug Prices Hearings 1989, supra note 9, at 155.
117. Gorman, supra note 96, at 57.
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drugs after a patent expires.'" 8 Other companies continue to price brand
name drugs as if the drugs were still under patent protection, even after a
number of generic products have come on the market at prices considerably
below that of the brand name drug."1 9 Thus, while the Act has helped pro-
vide for more low cost generic drugs, it has also increased the price of brand
name drugs. This increase, along with the public's shaken confidence in ge-
neric drugs in light of the generic drug scandal, tends to offset the Act's
desired effect of increasing the availability of low cost generic drugs.
The second objective of the Act was to create incentives for increased ex-
penditures for research and development of products subject to premarket
approval by the government. While research expenditures have risen signifi-
cantly from $5 billion in 1987120 to $7.3 billion in 1989,121 it is unclear how
much of this increase is directly attributable to the Act's patent term restora-
tion provision and how much is attributable to other factors such as infla-
tion, the "increasing complex nature of medicine" which "requires... larger
research budgets,"' 22 and tax incentives.' 23 Unlike the ANDA provision,
the effects of the patent term restoration provision are "only now beginning
to be felt," with only a hand-full of products in their extended patent
terms.124 Though "[s]ome experts believe [the patent term] extensions may
ultimately be converted into profits worth billions to the pioneer compa-
nies,"'12" it is likely that it will take years for producers of brand name drugs
to stabilize their pricing strategies given the opposing effects of increased
generic competition and extended patent terms.
IV. SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THE ACT
A number of proposals have been made for dealing with the consequences
118. Id. at 58. "When generic versions of the potent heart medication Dyazide were intro-
duced in the mid-1980s, the drug's inventor, SmithKline Beckman, raised the compound's
price 23% ...." Id.
119. Skyrocketing Prescription Drug Prices Hearings 1989, supra note 9, at 195. In a com-
parison of average wholesale price increases for brand name drugs under patent protection
(single source drugs) and brand name drugs whose patent term had expired (originator brand
of multiple source drugs), Laughrey testified that those under patent protection averaged price
increases of 7.9% in 1987 and 9% in 1988, whereas for those drugs whose patents had expired,
the price increases were 6.9% in 1988 and 6.4% in 1988. Id. at 194.
120. Competitive Problems Hearing 1987, supra note 59, at 58.
121. Skyrocketing Prescription Drug Prices Hearings 1989, supra note 9, at 122-23.
122. Gorman, supra note 96, at 57.
123. Skyrocketing Prescription Drug Prices Hearings 1989, supra note 9, at 4. Committee
Chairman Senator David Pryor argues that "[t]he 1986 tax law provided even more liberal
incentives for the drug companies in research and development and other tax breaks and subsi-
dies." Id.
124. Id. at 155 (statement of Gerald Mossinghoff, PMA president).
125. Hogan, supra note 13, at 850.
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of the increased availability of low cost generic drugs. These proposals have
come primarily in response to the generic drug scandal. The most notable is
the introduction of legislation by Congressman Dingell, whose subcommit-
tee investigated the scandal. 26 The legislation authorizes the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to bar individuals and companies from submit-
ting drug applications if previously convicted of illegal activities related to
the development or approval process of a generic drug. 2 " Additionally, the
Secretary is authorized to impose civil penalties on those convicted and to
suspend or withdraw the approval of ANDAs obtained through fraudulent
activity.' 2 The legislation also would give the inspector general of the De-
partment of Health and Human Services the authority to conduct investiga-
tions regarding allegations of impropriety by the FDA in a wide range of
areas.' 29 Finally, the bill includes a "sunshine provision" requiring public
disclosure of the applicant, drug, and FDA reviewers for each ANDA
submitted. 130
The debarment, withdrawal, suspension, and civil penalty provisions of
the proposed legislation were criticized as being directed exclusively at the
generic drug industry. James Benson, Acting Commissioner of the FDA,
took the position that the sanctions should be "in place across the board for
the products that the FDA regulates .... 1 On the other hand, the ge-
neric drug industry argued that the "selective focus" of a generics-only bill
"sends the public a clear but negative message that generics are second-class
medicine."' 32 Congressman Bliley (R-Va.), a co-sponsor of the legislation,
countered that "one of the principal reasons" for the abuses was the unique
abbreviated nature of the generic drug approval process which "justifies the
generic focus of our legislation."' 33 The proposed legislation was not en-
acted prior to the expiration of the 101st Congress. However, a similar bill
has been introduced recently and is pending.
1 3 4
CONCLUSION
Seven years after the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restora-
tion Act of 1984 became law, the twin objectives of Congress in passing the
legislation are arguably being accomplished. The abbreviated new drug ap-
126. H.R. 4810, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
127. H.R. 4810 § 2.
128. H.R. 4810 §§ 4-6.
129. H.R. 4810 § 8.
130. H.R. 4810 § 9.
131. Penalties Hearing 1990, supra note 67, at 41.
132. Id. at 60 (statement of Dee Fensterer, President GPIA).
133. Id. at 95 (statement of Congressman Bliley).
134. See H.R. 2454, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess (1991).
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plication procedures provided for in the Act have resulted in dramatic
growth in the lower priced generic prescription market. The effectiveness of
the Act's objective in promoting research and development of new drugs is
uncertain and should be continually monitored so that changes may be im-
plemented if the industry weakens. Achievement of Congressional objec-
tives under the Act has not come without disruption to the prescription drug
market and legislation to strengthen the enforcement powers of the FDA to
prevent abuse in the generic drug industry has been introduced. Perhaps
only after passage of additional time may a more definitive assessment of
whether the goals of the Act have been accomplished be appropriate.
Ralph A. Lewis
